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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:  
EXPRESSING RELIGION, ATTIRE, AND 
PUBLIC SPACES 
 
Lucy Vickers* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Religious expression has long been recognized as a 
fundamental element of the right to religious freedom. Article 18 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”)1 and Article 9 European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”)2 both protect the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, including the right to manifest religion 
in worship, observance, practice, and teaching. The expression of 
religion through religious attire is, in many cases, an important 
aspect of religious observance and practice, and thus comes 
within the protection of human rights law. As a result, the 
question of how to respond to religious attire in public spaces has 
traditionally been considered from a human rights perspective. 
                                                          
* Professor at Oxford Brookes University. 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). Article 18 reads, 
in part: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice, and teaching. 
Id. at 178. 
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, § 1, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter European 
Convention on Human Rights]. 
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Issues for debate have included the question of whether a dress 
code is religiously required,3 and when the rights of others may 
prevail over the right of an individual to express their religion.4 
This Article revisits the debate over when religious attire may be 
restricted in the public space through the alternative, but 
complementary, perspective of equality. It suggests that viewing 
this issue through the lens of equality may provide additional 
insights for these debates, and argues that when assessing the 
proportionality of any restriction on religious expression, the 
interest in equality should be taken into account. 
The Article focuses on the issue of religious dress as a form 
of religious expression. It begins by addressing the human rights 
approach to the protection of religious expression and discusses 
some of the difficulties which can arise from this approach, 
particularly with regard to the need to balance conflicting rights. 
It then discusses the ways in which an approach based on equality 
may provide additional insights into how to resolve some of those 
difficulties. It ends with a consideration of the factors that may be 
used when assessing the proportionality of restrictions on 
religious expression. 
 
I. HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 
 
Viewed from a human rights perspective, religious dress is 
generally understood as an example of the manifestation of 
religion. This manifestation of religion and belief is given 
qualified protection in most human rights regimes.5 Such a view 
allows plenty of scope for balancing human rights interests 
against other rights, such as rights to equality, and it is in this 
                                                          
3 The debate over whether practices have to be religiously required or 
merely religiously motivated is discussed in Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 7050/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 218 (1978). 
4 An example of how the “rights of others” may prevail over the right to 
religious expression can be seen in Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
175, 206–07 and Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447, where the 
equality rights of others prevailed over Sahin’s religious rights. 
5 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 9; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 18, § 3. 
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context that the interaction of rights related to religious 
expression via religious attire and the rights of others has 
traditionally been discussed. For example, under Article 9 of the 
ECHR the protection of religious expression is limited where 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In the context of 
religious dress, these limitations could, for example, be used to 
justify the removal of face veils in order to ensure proper 
identification at national borders,6 or to justify restrictions on 
flowing garments in order to limit infection control in hospitals.7 
Such examples are relatively uncontroversial. More contentious is 
when religious expression contests the broader category of “the 
rights and freedoms of others.”8 This raises a problem at the 
heart of religious freedom—whether the positive right to freedom 
of religion encompasses a corresponding negative right9 to have 
no religion or to be free from religion. Recognition of a negative 
right to religious freedom potentially allows for sweeping 
restrictions on religious expression. According to this view, 
religious attire may be restricted in public in order to protect the 
rights of those who wish to enjoy a public space free from 
religion and religious symbols.10  
In human rights law the method developed to manage the 
conflict between different rights is to undertake a balancing 
                                                          
6 See FOI Release, Guidance on How to Treat Women Wearing  
Clothing That Covers Their Face, UK Home Office (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-how-to-treat-women-
wearing-clothing-that-covers-their-face. 
7 Health and safety reasons were accepted by the European Court of 
Human Rights as a legitimate aim for restrictions on religious dress in a 
hospital in Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 
51671/10, and 36516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
8  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 9. 
9 A “negative right” is a right not to do something, which in this case, is 
a right to be free from religion, or a right not to practice a religion.  
10 For examples of the European Court of Human Rights cases discussing 
an interest in being free from religious influence and referring to the fact that 
Muslims who wear the headscarf can put under pressure those Muslims who 
choose not to, see Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 206–07; 
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R 447.  
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approach to determine where the correct boundaries of protection 
should lie. Human rights courts are experienced in seeking to 
resolve conflicting interests this way. Of course, such a balance 
can be hard to find, especially when human rights conventions 
are operating on a transnational level. In response, the European 
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) has developed the 
notion of the “margin of appreciation,” which allows a degree of 
flexibility to member states in their observance of the ECHR. 
This mechanism provides the member states of the ECHR with a 
“margin of appreciation” in setting the parameters of their 
domestic law, and states that restrictions will only be found to 
breach human rights norms when they fall outside this margin.11  
The margin of appreciation has particular significance with 
respect to freedom of religion cases and a fairly wide margin 
operates with regard to these cases in Europe, reflecting the lack 
of consensus about how freedom of religion cases should be 
treated.12 Indeed, this flexible approach means that there is no 
uniform approach to religious attire in Europe, despite being 
governed by a common human rights code. Some member states 
of the ECHR such as Turkey, France, and Belgium impose 
significant restrictions on religious attire at work and in the public 
space more generally.13 However, most other signatory states of 
the ECHR14 allow religious attire in public, with the UK allowing 
                                                          
11 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
737, 753 (1980). 
12 See CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 143–44 (2001). For example, in France the 
public sphere is strictly neutral, whereas the UK and Denmark have 
established churches.  
13 For an overview of the French position, see HANA VAN OOIJEN, 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC FUNCTIONS: UNVEILING STATE NEUTRALITY: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DUTCH, ENGLISH AND FRENCH JUSTIFICATIONS 
FOR LIMITING THE FREEDOM OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO DISPLAY RELIGIOUS 
SYMBOLS (2012). The Turkish position is set out in Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 17. 
14 The ECHR signatories include forty-seven member states, twenty-eight 
of which are members of the European Union. They are: Albania, Andorra, 
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
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perhaps the widest scope for when religious attire can be worn in 
public, including a range of public employment such as the police 
and judiciary.15 This broad range of responses to the question of 
what is the proper scope for restricting religious attire in the 
public space can serve as an illustration of how the “margin of 
appreciation” works in that they show that all these different 
responses, from the most restrictive of religious dress to the most 
liberal, can be lawful responses to the requirement to provide 
protection for religious freedom under the ECHR. In effect, as 
long as the protection for religion does not fall outside the range, 
or margin, it will remain lawful under the ECHR. These 
mechanisms enable the ECtHR to support a range of responses 
with regard to the issue of religious symbols, while maintaining a 
human rights-based approach to the issue.   
An example of this balancing mechanism can be found in the 
2005 Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Sahin v. Turkey.16 
In this case, a university student objected to the prohibition on 
religious attire being worn in her university and the ECHR17 
balanced the religious freedom of the student against the Turkish 
government’s interest in the protection of state neutrality.18 In 
reaching the conclusion that the ban was compatible with the 
ECHR, the court relied on the mechanism of the margin of 
appreciation and gave a wide margin to the Turkish government 
to decide whether it was in fact “necessary” in the Turkish 
political and cultural context to prohibit the wearing of religious 
                                                          
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and the United Kingdom. 
15 For an overview of the approaches to this matter in France, England, 
and the Netherlands, see VAN OOIJEN, supra note 13. 
16 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175. 
17 For a general introduction to the European Court of Human Rights, see 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Pieter van Dijk et al., eds., 4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF ECHR]. 
18 Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207–08. 
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symbols in teaching institutions. In the Sahin case, the ECHR 
recognized that the state’s primary interest was the need to 
protect secularism in the public sphere. Similarly, with regard to 
the pending case regarding the “burqa ban,” S.A.S v. France,19 
the state interest is framed in terms of security, the need to 
uphold gender equality, and to avoid Muslim women being cut 
off from society. These interests will need to be balanced against 
those of the individual women whose freedom of religious 
expression is severely limited by the ban.  
Although the approach to conflicting rights based on the 
balancing of interests within a margin of appreciation approach is 
well established,20 nonetheless profound questions remain about 
whether the resulting variety of practice across different countries 
should be acceptable within a single legal framework such as the 
ECHR. Greater clarity and consistency between different 
countries is desirable for a number of reasons. A key reason is 
because religious attire can form a significant element of religious 
identity, and it is important for individuals to have clarity about 
the extent to which this element of identity can be expressed in 
public. If religiously orthodox doctors and nurses, wishing to 
express religious faith through their attire, can do so in the U.K. 
but not in other parts of the E.U., then those same doctors and 
nurses are likely to not exercise the free movement of persons 
enjoyed by other citizens. Moreover, the need for consistency 
becomes particularly acute when the interference with religious 
freedom reaches beyond specific situations of work and education 
into the public sphere more generally. This can be seen through 
bans on the wearing of face coverings in public in France, 
                                                          
19 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11; see also Press Release, Grand 
Chamber Hearing Concerning the Prohibition on Wearing the Full-Face Veil 
in Public in France, European Court of Human Rights (Nov. 27, 2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4584709-
5542384. 
20 See THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ECHR, supra note 17; see also 
HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE 
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Thomas A. 
O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standard in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 474 
(1982). 
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Belgium, and the Netherlands.21  
However, there is danger inherent in forced clarity and 
consistency. Clarity and consistency in the legal treatment of 
religious attire might seem inherently desirable; certainly clarity 
will help both those subject to the law and those enforcing the law 
to be clear about what can and cannot be worn in public or at 
work. However, flexibility may be essential given the range of 
current practices across different jurisdictions and the lack of 
agreement about what should and should not be allowed in terms 
of religious dress. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in the 
balancing and “margin of appreciation” approach in human rights 
law remains attractive as it allows for a detailed examination of 
the facts of each case and for its context. One contextual issue 
that could be helpful in assessing how to treat religious attire is 
that of equality. In the next section of this article, I turn to 
consider the matter of religious attire from the perspective of 
equality, to consider whether arguments used in equality law can 
provide new ways to approach the debate. 
 
II. AN EQUALITY PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGIOUS ATTIRE 
 
Approaching the issue of religious attire from a perspective of 
equality will involve considering whether restrictions on attire 
have a differential impact on individuals on equality grounds. For 
example, it may be that restrictions impact differently on men and 
women, or on those of one religion more than another. Where 
this is the case, it can be seen that restrictions not only have 
implications for religious freedom but for gender and religious 
equality too.  
One particular concern related to religious freedom which 
may be viewed differently from an equality perspective is the 
issue of state neutrality. The need for a neutral public sphere is 
often viewed as in competition with claims for religious 
freedom.22 However, it is important to note when considering 
restrictions on religious expression from an equality perspective 
                                                          
21 See VAN OOIJEN, supra note 13. 
22 See, e.g., Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 175. 
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that legal arguments based on the value of “state neutrality” 
appear in a different light from when they are based on human 
rights perspectives. In effect, strict state neutrality fails to achieve 
equality because our social organization can never be truly 
“neutral.” The reason for this is two-fold. First, a strict neutrality 
position tends to assume that we can make a clear separation 
between the public and private spheres, and that it actually is 
“neutral” if the public sphere is “neutral.” However, if we 
consider lessons from equality jurisprudence, we can see that 
what may look “neutral” can in practice favor the dominant 
group. For example, in the U.S. it was recognized early on in 
discrimination jurisprudence that neutral rules can have a 
disparate impact on disadvantaged groups.23 The resulting concept 
of indirect discrimination was imported into UK law in the Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975, and then into EU law in the 1980s.24 
Thus, in the context of gender discrimination, it is well 
established that “neutral” norms tend in practice to be male 
norms, so that neutral rules requiring, for example, that workers 
be available to work full time, can be indirectly discriminatory on 
grounds of gender because fewer women than men can comply 
with them. 
This issue with “neutrality” can clearly be seen in the context 
of religion and belief, where the social organization is largely 
“Christian” rather than neutral. This means that most workers 
enjoy a day off from work on Sundays, as well as time off at 
Christmas and Easter. Thus religiously observant Christians will 
rarely come across work rules and dress codes with which they 
cannot comply, unless they work in an area of work that requires 
staffing all week. This situation arises because of the historical 
dominance of Christianity in Europe and the U.S., creating a 
                                                          
23 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
24 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Equality and United Kingdom Law: Past, 
Present, and Future, 2001 PUB. L. 77. See also Council Directive 76/207, O.J. 
L. 39/40 (1976) (“[T]”he principle of equal treatment shall mean that there 
shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or 
indirectly . . . .”).  This directive is often referred to as the Equal Treatment 
Directive. 
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system where the wider society is organized in ways that are 
compatible with mainstream Christian practice.  
Second, not only have the dominant social organizations 
adapted to accommodate mainstream Christian practice; but also 
Christianity itself has, arguably, adapted to the idea of the 
“secular” or at least “neutral” social model adopted in much of 
the EU and also in the U.S. This results, again, in Christians 
being able to comply more easily with workplace rules than 
individuals of other religions. A simple example illustrates the 
adaptability of Christianity: early Christians adapted the pagan 
winter festivals and turned those once pagan festivals into today 
what is known as Christmas. Arguably this helped the young 
religion gain acceptance in what was otherwise a hostile 
environment. Moreover, there is some Biblical authority which 
supports such an adaptive process: the command to “give to God 
what is God’s and to Caesar what is Caesar’s”25 provides many 
Christians a relatively easy method to reconcile civic duty with 
religious duty.  
In addition to these examples of Christianity’s adaptability to 
secular power, Protestant Christianity in particular has developed 
a specific theology that makes it adaptive. This involves the idea 
of the separation between body and mind, with faith more a 
matter of the mind and its state of “righteousness” than a matter 
of the body.26 This, again, arguably allows for greater 
accommodation of secularism within Christianity itself. A full 
theological discussion of these ideas is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but put simply, Christian theology is largely based on 
orthodoxy or “correct belief.” Although debates of course 
continue within Christianity about the precise relationship 
between “faith” and “works,” nonetheless, the religion is based 
less on what the individual does and more on what he or she 
believes (in religious terms, his or her relationship with God). 
This means that the focus is on belief, and so dress codes and 
                                                          
25 Matthew 22:21. 
26 See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL RELIGIONS (Mark 
Juergensmeyer ed., 2006).  
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rules of attire, together with strict dietary rules or prayer rituals, 
tend to be less central as signifiers of religious observance. In 
contrast, religions such as Judaism and Islam have a greater focus 
on orthopraxy: a concern for correct religious practice as 
signifiers of religious adherence. In these traditions, codes of 
conduct related to attire, diet, and prayers have greater 
prominence as means to practice and observe religion. It is these 
religious practices that can cause conflicts with the secular world. 
The greater focus on orthodoxy in Christianity, rather than 
orthopraxy, may provide an additional explanation of the relative 
lack of conflict between Christian practice and the secular world.  
It is arguable, then, that the adaptive process between the 
secular Euro-American world and Christianity has been a two-
way process. In part, the “world” has adapted to accommodate 
the dominant religion. One example is recognition of Sunday as 
the Sabbath day of Christianity and thus generally recognized as a 
day of rest. But in part, Christianity itself has adapted so that 
conflicts are reduced: there are few external requirements, such 
as head covering, for observant Christians to comply with, 
requirements which might otherwise conflict with secular 
practice.  
If these theological understandings are brought into the debate 
over equality and religious attire, it becomes clear that so-called 
“neutral” rules, which prohibit the wearing of religious attire, are 
doubly non-neutral. First, it is more likely that adherents to 
minority faiths have rules of observance that are of such religious 
significance. Second, such rules can have a disparate impact upon 
adherents of minority faiths because the rules of those minority 
faiths are less likely to be compatible with mainstream social 
norms. This means that although rules which restrict religious 
attire can seem formally neutral, in practice they have a disparate 
impact on religious minorities. 
The importance within religions of “right conduct” explains 
why some religiously observant individuals may appear to be 
what has been termed “obdurate believers,”27 or those who will 
                                                          
27 This phrase was coined by Anthony Bradney in his essay, Faced by 
Faith, in FAITH IN LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 90, 91 (Peter Oliver et al. 
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not yield their religious beliefs or practices to other interests. For 
such individuals, a choice between removing religious attire and 
leaving the public space will not result in the removal of religious 
attire. Thus a seemingly neutral public space will be achieved at 
the expense of the religious believer, whose belief will remain 
hidden. In the context of religions based on orthodoxy, a split 
between private religious observance and public religious 
neutrality can be understood in terms of separating the personal 
and the public: what is God’s is private, and can be kept private; 
what is public (“Caesar’s”) can remain in public.28 The split 
remains a reasonably neat solution to the problem of reconciling 
personal religion with the neutral public space. However, applied 
to religions of orthopraxy, attempts to exclude personal belief 
from the public sphere results in the exclusion of the person 
altogether.  
The importance of “orthopraxy” in some faiths explains the 
inequality that can arise when certain religious practices are 
restricted in public, and lessons from an equality perspective may 
be instructive in this context. For example, it has long been 
recognized that if women’s participation at work is to be 
increased, then some accommodation of the family is needed. 
This can be through a workplace nursery provision, maternity 
leave, or other support for working mothers. If the argument 
were to be accepted that women’s family responsibilities are 
private matters, best left in the private sphere, then there would 
be no need for such workplace provisions. Yet within Europe it 
has been accepted that such an approach does not lead women to 
work on equal terms with men.29 If no accommodation of family 
life is offered, then many women will not leave their “personal 
matters” at home and head out to work; instead, they will stay at 
home. Many of the hard-won workplace rights, such as maternity 
leave, are predicated on the idea that such practical support is 
necessary if women are to be able to participate in the 
                                                          
eds., 2000). 
28 Matthew 22:21. 
29 See, for example, the extensive workplace protection for gender 
equality within the European Union, going back to 1957 when the principle of 
equal pay for equal work became part of the founding Treaty of Rome.  
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workplace.30 This lesson can be applied outside of the workplace, 
too: if we wish to include people in our societies, we need to 
provide some reasonable level of accommodation for their basic 
needs.  
Applied to the ground of religion and belief, this equality-
based reasoning suggests that outright bans on religious 
expression will lead to unequal results. Bans on religious 
expression will have a disparate impact on minority religious 
groups; they will lead to the removal of individuals holding these 
beliefs from the public sphere and will hamper attempts to 
include such individuals in mainstream society. Thus, it is clear 
that if inclusion of religious minorities is a society’s aim, then 
some accommodation of religious practice is essential. If 
headscarves are banned at work, many Muslim women will not 
remove the headscarf and go to work; they will stay at home.  If 
turbans cannot be worn by public sector workers, Sikh men will 
not cut their hair; they will just not work in the public sector. 
Arguments based on this reasoning apply to the public space as 
well: if face coverings are banned in the public sphere, those 
women who wear them will in effect be excluded from the public 
sphere.  
These arguments, based on the perspective of equality law, 
demonstrate that what can look like simple neutrality may not, in 
practice, be experienced as neutral. The public sphere is not as 
neutral as might at first be supposed and the religions themselves 
are not equally placed in relation to the public space, meaning 
that similar treatment of religious individuals will not result in all 
of those individuals having the same experience. Religious groups 
are not alike, and equal treatment by way of the neutral public 
space will not result in “like” experiences. It is clear that policies 
which do not accommodate religious differences ensure there is 
no equal participation in public life; instead there is exclusion. 
Thus, if we exclude the personal from the public sphere, we 
exclude the person as well.  
These equality-based perspectives suggest that an absolute ban 
on religious attire in the public space fails to give sufficient 
                                                          
30 See SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1998).  
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recognition to the interests of religious individuals. They suggest 
that the better legal response is to ensure, instead, that there is 
consideration of the nuances and complexity involved in 
regulating religious practice. As has been argued above, 
responding to the plural religious landscape by creating a purely 
secular public space fails to recognize the deeply unequal way 
this would affect religious minorities. Instead, a more plural 
public space is required, with room for the religious and the 
secular to coexist, and even to engage in dialogue with one 
another. 
To suggest a plural public space, however, is not to suggest 
that restrictions on religious freedom can never be imposed. 
Human rights protection for religion does not require absolute 
protection for religious practice. It does require, however, that 
any restrictions on religion have a legitimate aim, and that the 
restrictions on religious practice remain proportionate to that aim. 
Proportionality requires that no more be done to restrict the 
religious practice than is needed to achieve the legitimate aim.31 
The second part of this paper considers how and when restrictions 
on religious expression, through religious attire, may be justified, 
viewed through the equality context.  
 
III. WHEN WILL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ATTIRE BE 
JUSTIFIED?  
 
The ECtHR has heard a number of human rights cases (some 
referred to above),32 all involving challenges to the prohibition of 
religious dress at work. In these cases the prohibitions on 
religious dress at work have been upheld.33 In Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, for example, the ECtHR held that the prohibition of 
the headscarf imposed on a Muslim teacher of young children 
                                                          
31 See Council Directive 2000/78, art. 2, §(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 
18–19 (EC). 
32 Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.. 
33 See Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175; Dahlab v. Switzerland, 
2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993). 
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was proportionate because the teacher had influence on the 
intellectual and emotional development of children.34 The court 
also took into account the fact that, as a public sector employee, 
the teacher was a “representative of the state.”35 The court also 
mentioned in its reasoning the fact that the headscarf is “hard to 
square with the principle of gender equality.”36 In Sahin v. 
Turkey37 the court balanced the religious freedom of a student 
against the Turkish government’s interest in the protection of 
state neutrality, in holding that the restriction on wearing a 
headscarf was justified. The court also noted the government’s 
argument that the wearing of a headscarf may put other students 
under pressure to adopt more fundamentalist approaches to their 
faith.  
However, viewed from an equality perspective, and drawing 
on the insights discussed above, it can be strongly argued that 
these decisions fail to respect the equality interests of religious 
minorities. Instead, a more sensitive approach to justification is 
needed; one that takes into consideration the wide range of 
factors involved in cases involving religious expression through 
attire and other symbols.  
An example of a more sensitive consideration of the factors 
that can be relevant when considering restrictions on religious 
attire can be seen in the case of Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitan 
Borough Council.38 Azmi was a teaching assistant who wanted to 
wear the niqab39 when in the presence of male colleagues.40 She 
was dismissed for refusing the employer’s request to remove the 
niqab when assisting in class.41 Her initial claim to the court 
                                                          
34 Dahlab, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 449–50. 
35 Id. at 462. 
36 Id. at 463. 
37 Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 204–05. 
38  Azmi v. Kirklees Met. Borough Council, [2007] I.C.R. 1154, available 
at 2007 WL 1058367. 
39 A niqab is a face-covering for women that veils the face and hair down to 
the shoulders, with a small opening for the eyes. 
40 Azmi, [2007] I.C.R. at 1157. 
41 Id. at 1161. 
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alleging direct and indirect discrimination was unsuccessful.42 
The court did accept that there was prima facie indirect 
discrimination since the refusal to allow Azmi to wear the niqab 
put her at a particular disadvantage when compared with others,43 
but the indirect discrimination was justified. The court held that 
the restriction on wearing the niqab was proportionate given the 
need to uphold the interests of the children in having the best 
possible education.44 What is interesting about the case is that the 
court noted45 that the school had performed a thorough 
investigation before reaching the conclusion that the restriction 
was necessary. For example, it undertook a review of Azmi’s 
teaching to see if the quality of teaching was reduced when Azmi 
wore the face covering and came to the conclusion that it was; the 
school also investigated whether it was possible to rearrange 
Azmi’s timetable to enable her to assist only in classes with a 
female teacher and found that this was not possible.46 In relation 
to the question of justification, Azmi however argued that 
insufficient effort had been made to try to accommodate her 
religious requirements; for example, the school could have tried 
to assess alternative ways to improve her communication and 
performance when wearing the niqab.47 The court, however, held 
that the school had sufficiently shown that the restriction on 
wearing the niqab was proportionate to the school’s aim of 
providing effective education for the students.48  
The Azmi case illustrates how a proportionate response to 
what might otherwise be indirectly discriminatory can require a 
careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case. This 
“fact-sensitive” approach can enable a full analysis to be 
undertaken to determine whether any accommodation of the 
                                                          
42 She also claimed victimization and was successful due to inadequacies 
on the part of the employer in dealing with her case. See id. at 1155. 
43 Under the U.K. Equality Act 2010 and the E.U. Equality Directive 
2000/78 indirect discrimination occurs where a person is put at a particular 
disadvantage by an apparently neutral rule. 
44  Azmi, [2007] I.C.R. at 1169, 1172. 
45 Id. at 1172. 
46 Id. at 1169–70. 
47 Id. at 1160. 
48 Id. at 1169–70.  
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religious practice can be achieved without compromising the 
competing interests at stake. In Azmi, the court found that the 
competing interest in maximizing the children’s educational 
experience could not be achieved if the required accommodation 
was given.49 It is noteworthy that in Azmi the religious practice 
involved the covering of the face, which was found to impede 
communication in a context where non-verbal communication is 
essential. It is quite possible that in other cases, where the 
religious practice does not directly affect the purpose of 
employment, some accommodation of religious practice may be 
required in order to avoid the disparate impact that such 
restrictions can have on religious minorities.  
A similar fact-sensitive approach can be seen in R (on the 
application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh 
High School.50 The case involved a pupil’s freedom of religious 
expression that was in conflict with the rights of others; here the 
right of the school to determine the dress code for the school. The 
school had a uniform which prohibited a female student from 
wearing the jilbab.51 The reason for imposing the uniform was to 
promote harmony between the different races, religions, and 
cultures represented in the school, and to foster a sense of 
cohesion and community within the school. There had been some 
history of conflict between pupils in the past, with pupils defining 
themselves along racial lines, and the school viewed the uniform 
as necessary as a way to combat these problems and to prevent 
the development of sub-groups identified by dress.52 In the case, 
the English House of Lords was asked to review a school’s 
decision not to allow Begum to attend school wearing the jilbab. 
As with Azmi, the court upheld the decision of the school,53 but 
only after a careful, fact-intensive review. The court recognized 
                                                          
49 Id. at 1172. 
50 R (on the application of Begum) v. Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh 
High Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 2006 WL 
690559. 
51 A loose fitting garment which hides the contours of the body, associated 
with Muslim women. 
52 Id. at [18]. 
53 Begum, [2006] UKHL 15 at [40]–[41], [71], [91], [99]. 
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that the school had undertaken detailed discussion in reaching its 
decision.54 The school had consulted local religious leaders and 
had uniform requirements which met with common Islamic dress 
codes, in that it allowed for several uniform options, one of 
which was a salwar kameez55 which could be worn with the 
school tie and school jumper.56 The court recognized that the 
school’s decision creating the uniform requirements had been 
discussed fairly carefully beforehand. The House of Lords also 
noted that there was evidence that the school had previously 
suffered the ill effects of groups of pupils defining themselves 
along racial lines, with consequent conflict between them.57 Thus, 
based on the facts and due to the careful appraisal at the local 
level, the House of Lords upheld the restrictions on religious 
attire imposed by the school since the restriction struck a 
proportionate balance between the conflicting interests at stake in 
the case.58  
Of course it will always be arguable that the court could have 
reached a different conclusion: it may be that Begum could have 
been accommodated without undue harm to others.59 However, 
although one might disagree with the conclusion reached in the 
case, it is clear that the court’s use of fact-based decision making 
allowed for a more contextual and sensitive decision. This type of 
decision making allows space in the legal framework for the 
complexity of the issue to be considered. This way the decision 
making process includes a full examination of religious freedom 
and equality concerns.  
The benefit of submitting any prohibition on religious attire to 
the test of proportionality, assessed in light of a detailed factual 
examination, as was done in Azmi and Begum, is that a wide 
range of factors can be taken into account to decide the legality of 
                                                          
54 Id. at [33]. 
55 A sleeveless smock-like dress with the loose trousers. 
56 Begum, [2006] UKHL 15at [34]. 
57 Id. at [18]. 
58 Id. at [68], [98]. 
59 See Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: 
Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2629, 2654 (2009).  
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a prohibition. This allows for a nuanced examination of the facts, 
which reflects the context of the prohibition, the rights of others 
such as pupils or colleagues, additional options that may be open 
to the individual, and the practical effect of any gender-based 
claims. For example, restrictions on headscarves on the basis that 
men impose them on women, or that headscarves create social 
pressure on others to conform, should be tested empirically. 
There is evidence that the courts’ assumptions that headscarves 
are worn by Muslim women because their male relatives force 
them to do so is incorrect in many cases.60 This is not to deny that 
in some instances this may happen, but, equally, legal policy 
should not be made on the assumption that this is usually the 
case. A model of legal protection based on a detailed review of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding each individual case 
enables courts and tribunals to reach reasoned decisions that are 
both flexible and responsive to the complexity of the issues 
involved.  
While there are many benefits to a factually sensitive review 
as a model of protection for religious attire in the public sphere, 
such an approach does have some drawbacks. In particular, it can 
lead to uncertainty and inconsistency of approaches between 
different courts and different contexts. This can make it difficult 
to predict with certainty how any individual case will be resolved. 
For example, in Begum, the House of Lords stated:  
It is important to stress at the outset that this case 
concerns a particular pupil and a particular school 
in a particular place at a particular time. It must be 
resolved on facts which are now, for purposes of 
the appeal, agreed. The House is not, and could 
not be, invited to rule whether Islamic dress, or 
any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not 
be permitted in the schools of this country.61 
The court is extremely clear that it is not setting precedent for 
                                                          
60 See Melanie Adrian, France, the Veil and Religious Freedom, 34 
RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 345, 349 (2009); see also Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in 
the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance of Empirical Findings, 
22 J.L. & POL’Y 517 (2014).  
61 Begum, [2006] UKHL 15 at [2]. 
2014.04.24 VICKERS.DOCX 5/11/2014  12:19 PM 
 RELIGION, ATTIRE, AND PUBLIC SPACES  609 
how other schools should determine the issue of uniform and 
Islamic dress. Instead, the judgment focuses on the process by 
which the issue of religious attire should be determined: that the 
decision should be made with due acknowledgment of the impact 
any decision may have on religious freedom.  
An additional concern with such a fact sensitive review is that 
the many and varied factors identified as relevant in the 
consideration of proportionality on any restriction of religious 
expression may create a false sense of objectivity, masking the 
fact that the judgment is ultimately personal and subjective. This 
potentially runs the danger of perpetuating precisely the 
disadvantage that the creation of legal protection for religious 
interests should prevent, namely the dominance of minority 
religious interests by the majority.  
The concern over undue subjectivity is a powerful argument, 
but while fact-sensitive review may never be fully objective, 
neither is it fully subjective. The factors to determine the proper 
boundaries of religious expression when balanced against other 
concerns, are not drawn at random but are chosen as a result of 
careful consideration of the range of competing interests at stake. 
This includes the extent to which any claims are empirically 
valid, and the theoretical reasons for protecting the competing 
interests at all. Not every interest will be relevant. Thus, this 
fact-based proportionality approach relies on reasoned and 
principled analysis to determine which factors are relevant.  
Moreover, this proportionality approach allows room for any 
decision relating to religious attire to be tested: any decisions 
reached must be open, and the factors which were relevant 
subject to review. Although ultimately courts may allow for some 
flexibility in the exercise of any discretion by decision makers 
such as schools or employers, this approach allows for challenges 
to be made if an important factor has been left out of the 
equation. Thus, a determination that an individual cannot wear 
religious attire at work or in school must be proportionate; it 
must take into account not only the needs of the business or 
school, but also the individual’s interest in freedom of religious 
expression. Where the religious interests of the employee have 
not been taken into account, this may mean that a decision can be 
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challenged on the basis that it is disproportionate.  
In sum, although there may be strong equality-based reasons 
to favor a plural public space, some restrictions on religious 
freedom will inevitably be necessary. Subjecting any proposed 
restriction on religion to a fact-sensitive proportionality review 
should mean that contextually sensitive decisions can be reached, 
with full account taken of relevant equality concerns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
An approach to the question of when and to what extent a 
person should enjoy freedom of religious expression via their 
choice of attire can be considered both from a human rights 
perspective and from an equality perspective. Of course these two 
perspectives are inherently linked, but nonetheless are different. 
The consideration of equality concerns in this context serves to 
highlight the need for sensitive responses to calls to restrict 
religious attire in the public sphere. Without a clear 
understanding of the equality dimensions to the debate, questions 
about the role of religious attire may be resolved merely from the 
point of view of competing interests in religious freedom: the 
balance being between the right to freedom of religious 
expression and the rights of others to be free from religious 
symbols, particularly in the public sphere. Moreover, the use of 
the margin of appreciation in European human rights law means 
that the final standard of review on any restrictions of religious 
attire is weak: restrictions are effectively assessed against a 
“norm-reflecting” standard. This means that the case law under 
ECHR tends to accept current standards of protection for 
religion, even where standards are fairly low, rather than 
engaging in the setting of high standards of rights protection.  
One of the reasons for weak protection for religious claims in 
the public space has been the competing interest in having a 
religiously neutral or secular public sphere. Yet while calls for a 
secular public space certainly have validity, when revisited in the 
light of the concerns that can be raised from an equality 
perspective, such claims lose some of their force. The recognition 
that secular or neutral public spaces lead to unequal outcomes for 
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different, and usually minority, religious groups means that 
additional factors need to be taken into account when balancing 
competing rights. I propose that, when assessing the 
proportionality of any restrictions on religious attire, the interest 
in equality needs to be added to the balance, and an approach 
allowing for the setting of standards needs to be used, rather than 
the norm-reflecting margin of appreciation. With the recognition 
that unequal results can arise from a reliance on neutrality in the 
public sphere, it becomes clear that outright bans on the wearing 
of religious attire in the public sphere are unsustainable. This is 
not to say that more limited restrictions will never be allowed: as 
the discussion of the cases of Azmi and Begum illustrate, there 
remains scope for religious attire to be restricted, but only after 
careful review of the facts of the case. This more fact-sensitive 
review allows for the complexity of the issues surrounding 
religious equality and religious expression to have its proper 
space in the legal discourse. 
 
